Many simple calculations can be done easier without computers than by using them. We show that the same holds for secure multiparty computations if the function to be computed is simple enough. Our starting point is an observation of Bert den Boer: a multiparty computation of a logical ANDgate can be performed by ve simple playing cards. We show that by using a reasonable amount of cards many useful functions can be computed in such way that each input stays private.
Introduction
Bigger and bigger amounts of computations are taken care of by computers but also other computing methods seem to survive. A pencil and a piece of paper are still more easily accessible than a computer. It is also clear that many simple calculations can be made much easier without computers.
On the other hand, people often take a prejudiced attitude in regard to the use of computers. By experience they learn that, for instance, automatic teller machines very seldom miscalculate but the attitude does not totally vanish. This fact is one obstacle that prevents expansion of practical use of cryptographic protocols. Even if a protocol is provably secure against all cheaters people are afraid that their own personal computers may not function exactly as they assume them to do.
For example, let us consider a system for computerized elections (see, e.g. 1], 5] or 6]). It might be the case that every transmission between the PC of a user and the system is perfectly secure and no information about the voting strategy of the user is leaked out. Still, the user is not easily convinced that all inputs given by the keyboard are not saved into some hidden les where computer experts can read them.
There are also other reasons in favour of constructing computation methods that do not depend on computers: electricity might be cut in a critical moment, computers also break down occasionally, computers are not very cheap, a network of PC's is not easily portable etc. Sometimes it is also possible to nd computing methods that are more convenient than use of computers.
We investigate secure multiparty computations (see, e.g., 3]). One of their typical features is that the function to be computed collectively by the participants is itself relatively easy to compute but heavy computations are needed to hide the input of each participant from the others. For instance, assume a small group wants to take a secret vote in a meeting. Surely, it is usually much easier to construct ballots and a ballot box than to set up a computer voting protocol even if computers are available. Using this traditional method, individual inputs are hidden by shu ing them in a box. Unfortunately, this hiding method works only for a very limited number of functions.
Our purpose is to construct respective physical hiding methods for a larger class of functions. The starting point is an elegant protocol of Bert den Boer 2] : ve simple playing cards are used in order to compute the value of logical AND. The secrecy of inputs is essentially guaranteed by \cutting the deck" a couple of times. Although AND is a very simple function, it has several meaningful applications. In addition to the one given in 2] let us mention 1 the following one. Two parties are trying to make a contract (for example, the parties could be an employer and a labor union). If the negotiations do not succeed an arbitrator might be called to propose a compromise. For tactical reasons, the parties do not want to tell immediately (not even to the arbitrator) whether or not they accept the proposal. Instead, a card protocol is used to decide whether or not both parties accept the proposal.
We generalize the ve card trick of 2] to cover any Boolean function. The number of cards needed grows in the worst case linearly with respect to the number of gates in the circuit that corresponds to the function. It is not very easy to handle a deck of one thousand cards but several useful functions can be computed with a far smaller deck. The time complexity of the protocol grows also linearly with respect to the number of gates.
In 4] Claude Cr epeau and Joe Kilian use similar methods to obtain a solitary card protocol for selecting a random permutation with no xed points. In fact, their paper includes all the necessary tools for a general protocol for multiparty computations. The di erence to our work is that we use a smaller alphabet (i.e. a smaller number of di erent cards), and our protocol is also more e cient.
One big problem in computing with cards is the fact that it is not easy to make identical copies of a hidden card. Suppose you have several identical cards of each type available. One card is on the table with face down. How to replace this one card with two similar ones without revealing the type of the original card? In the nal part of the paper we give a partially successful answer to the problem.
The basic protocol
We rst consider a two-party cryptographic protocol for evaluating the value of a binary AND-gate. In 2] the situation is illustrated as follows. Alice and Bob have just met and they want to nd out whether they have some particular mutual interest. However, they are both reluctant to show their interest unless they know that the other one is also interested. Unfortunately, no third party trusted by both of them is available.
More formally: Alice has a secret bit a and Bob has a secret bit b. They want to nd out the conjunction a^b of these bits, but they are not ready to reveal their own secret bits. In other words, if a = 0, Alice should not be able to nd out b, and vice versa. (Of course, if a = 1 then Alice knows that b = a^b.) How to proceed?
In 2] den Boer gives a protocol to solve the problem physically. He uses a deck of ve cards. Two cards are red and three cards are green, for example. It is clear that we can compute some other binary Boolean functions analogously. For example, the result of an OR-gate is obtained by just reversing the commitment rule for both Alice and Bob. As a consequence, the result is 0 i the two red cards are next to each other.
Notations
In the following we consider cards as elements of an alphabet and ordered sets of cards (i.e. decks) as words over . The topmost card is the rst letter of the word etc. If w 2 we denote w = w 1 : : : w n , where w i 2 . We de ne functions f i by f i : ! ; f i (w) = w i+1 : : : w n w 1 : : : w i (i = 1; 2; : : : ; n):
In other words, if w is a deck of cards, f i (w) is obtained by moving the i topmost cards to the bottom of the deck. We also adopt the notation hwi = ff i (w) j i = 1; 2; : : : ; ng; i.e. hwi is the set of cyclic permutations of w.
Our deck of cards consists of two di erent kinds of cards: green ones and red ones. The cards have two possible states: they are either \face down" or \face up". Therefore we de ne two sets: = fG; Rg corresponding to the face down cards, and = fg; rg corresponding to the face up cards. Using this notation we have = . For variables corresponding to the face down cards we usually use capital letters X; Y; : : :, and small letters x; y; : : : are used with face up cards. Similarly, we use variables U; V; : : : (resp., u; v; : : :) for a deck of face down (resp., face up) cards. We also denote G = R, R = G, g = r and r = g. Let We assume that it is possible to compute F in such way that no one learns the index i. (This is acceptable, since in practice anyone is able to cut a deck of cards in such way that the others cannot observe the exact point of the cut. F can then be computed by letting each participant in turns to cut the deck.) To get familiar with our notation, we redescribe the basic protocol for AND, given in the previous section. Although the protocol has only two participants, we found it convenient to introduce also a \middleman" M. Whatever M does, M does it publicly. In other words, both A and B know everything that M knows. For example, if M computes '(X) then both A and B nd out the value. But if A or B computes it, the other will not learn it. In practice, either A or B or both of them together may take the role of M. It is clear that in the protocol ( ) = a and that B cannot gure out the bit a.
The ve card trick can now be described as follows. 
Computing AND, NOT and OR in encrypted form
The goal of this paper is to construct a \card protocol" for any Boolean function. It seems to be a reasonable approach to build such a general protocol from protocols for simple Boolean operators. These basic protocols should produce a commitment of the output bit, so that it can later be used as input without knowing the value of the bit it encrypts. In some cases the same input is needed several times in the computation. As our physical card commitments are unreusable, we also need a protocol for copying commitments (without viewing the cards). The following quite natural protocol has also been given in 4]. The total number of cards needed in this protocol is 2k +4, four of which are \free" after the protocol. It should be noted that while constructing k copies, we loose the original commitment. Thus, there is no sense in producing only one copy.
In the following we assume that all formulas are composed of AND, NOT and OR operators only. We give a protocol for each operator.
NOT
Computing NOT in encrypted form is trivial. Obviously, if 2 D, then (f 1 ( )) = 1 ? ( ). In other words: it is enough to change the order of the commitment cards. To preserve the original commitment we need to take rst two copies of , as explained above.
AND
The AND protocol described in section 3 is not suitable for our purposes: we need the output in encypted form. In this section we modify the protocol to obtain the desired properties. 
Theorem 2 In the protocol above, ( ) = ( )^ ( ), but no further information on ( ), ( ) or ( ) is revealed.
Proof. Because of the construction of the word U in step 2 we know that
, where u = '( Gf 1 ( )). Thus, also in step 3, '(U 0 ) = u 02 , where u 0 2 hui. After step 4 we know that u 0 1 = r. Now we have only four possible cases: u 0 = rrggg (outcome is 1) or u 0 = rgrgg (0) or u 0 = rggrg (0) or u 0 = rgggr (1) . M has no information of which alternative is the correct one. However, we notice that if u 0 2 It remains to be shown that no unintended information on the commitments leaks during the protocol. This is quite obvious. After step 4 we know that either U 0 = (RGGZZ) 2 or U 0 = (RZZGG) 2 . But, because we do not know whether Z = G or Z = R, this amounts to nothing.
In addition to the four input cards we need eight more cards to perform the protocol: First we need six cards in taking two copies of . Four cards are free after the copying | thus only two more cards are needed while copying . Again four cards (two red and two green cards) are ready for reuse, and the two green cards are used as middle cards in step 2. After the protocol, 10 of the 12 cards involved are free and two cards encrypt the outcome.
Again, if we need the original commitments later, we should take a copy of them. This can be done before we perform the protocol, but it is more convenient to do it during the protocol. In step 1 we need to take copies of the inputs anyway, so without any trouble we can take one copy more. Then, however, we need four more cards | thus the necessary number of cards increases up to 16.
Our AND protocol is probabilistic. In step 3 we keep shu ing the deck and looking up the color of the topmost card, until the card is red. Because four of the ten cards are red, the expected number of loops is 2 1 2 . We have found a solution to avoid this minor problem. However, the solution is much more complicated and the number of necessary cards is 44. We omit the solution here.
OR
Because p _ q = :(:p^:q), it is easy to modify the AND protocol to obtain a protocol for OR. The only changes are in step 2, where now M constructs U = (f 1 ( )G ) 2 , and in step 5, where the nal output is reversed. It would be equally easy to construct a protocol for the She er function NAND. It is, however, more convenient to construct more complicated computations using AND, NOT and OR than by using NAND.
Computing any Boolean function
In this section we give a general protocol for computing any Boolean function. The protocol is straight-forward: rst the participants commit to their secret bits and then the value of the function (circuit) is evaluated proceeding operator by operator (gate by gate) using the protocols of the preceeding section. The nal commitment obtained from the last gate is then revealed. We do not give a proof or a detailed desription of the protocol, as they should be obvious after the preceeding section. Obviously, the number of cards needed in this protocol is 2(N + S) + 10.
After the protocol we still have a commitment of each input bit and the output bit of every gate. In most cases this is not necessary and hence the actual number of cards needed is usually lower. A better estimation on the necessary number of cards is obtained by counting the maximum number of bits that need to be remembered simultaneously during the protocol. If this number is denoted by P, then we can manage with 2P + 10 cards. The AND function is an example of a threshold function. The value of a threshold function is fully determined by the number of 1's (or 0's) among the input bits. It is quite easy to see that when computing a threshold function with N input bits, only N + 2 bits need to be remembered at each moment. Thus, N people can make a majority decision using a deck of 2N + 14 cards in such way, that the exact number of yes and no votes will not be revealed.
Zero-knowledge with cards
Zero-knowledge proofs are important building blocks in many cryptographic protocols. In such a proof a prover P convinces a veri er V of the validity a given (mathematical) statement. The characteristic property is that although V gets convinced, she learns nothing of the proof itself. For instance, assume that P knows a satisfying assignment for a Boolean formula. Using a zeroknowledge proof P can convince V that the formula is satis able without giving away any information on the assignment he knows. As a consequence, V cannot later convince any third party of the satis ability.
Our protocol for secure multiparty computation can obviously be modi ed to obtain zero-knowledge proofs for satis ability. P is the only one with secrets, thus he performs all the necessary operations. P applies the protocol 9 to compute the value of the Boolean formula using the satisfying assignment.
V participates only by watching.
Unfortunately, the instances where zero-knowledge proofs have any signi cance are so large that we would need a huge deck of cards. Thus, this property of our protocol is interesting only from a theoretical point of view. Nevertheless, this example shows that even complicated cryptographic protocols can be implemented without massive computing power. 6 How to copy only one card?
The protocol 3 is a simple method for making copies of two face down cards which are known to be red and green but the order is not known. An obvious problem related to this is the following: is it possible to copy a single card similarly? This is clearly a more di cult task.
All our protocols are based on the idea of coding information in the order of cards, hence the problem of copying one card is irrelevant in our setting. However, the opportunity to produce copies of a single card seems to be a very useful tool in constructing new protocols. That is the reason why we devote one section to this problem.
We cannot give a complete and fully satisfactory solution to the problem but our next protocol is a partial solution which may be su cient in some cases. The disadvantage of our solution is the possibility that some information about the colour of the card is leaked out. The probability of a leak can be made arbitrarily small but only at the cost of exponentially increasing number of cards. 
Conclusions and further research
We have shown that it is possible to compute any Boolean function by using only red and green playing cards in such way that during the computation each participant learns nothing else but the nal output. The number of cards is a linear function of the number of gates in a circuit corresponding to the computed function. Although this rate of growth is mild it is important to try to minimize the number of cards needed in computing some speci c functions that may have practical applications. More e cient protocols might use, e.g. more colours than just two.
Our protocols are based on the assumption that cyclic permutations of a deck are indistinguishable or symmetric. In group-theoretical terms it can be said that we operate in a cyclic symmetry group. A possible generalization is to move into dihedral groups. Then also a deck and its mirror image are indistinguishable. This case has also a physical interpretation.
Consider a \necklace" containing small identical boxes hanging from a string. Tiny balls of di erent colours can be put inside the boxes. Now it is possible to rotate the string corresponding to cutting of the deck and we may also turn the necklace upside down which is a new kind of shu ing operation.
